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1. See generally Tullio Treves, THE LAW OF THE SEA: THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS
MEMBER STATES (Tullio Treves, ed., 1997), at 1-5.  Annex IX of the Convention permits
certain “international organizations” to become parties to the Convention under certain
stipulated conditions.  See also Daniel Vignes, La Communauté européenne dans le
domaine du droit général de la mer, in id. at 7-26.
2. For “a detailed survey of the attitudes and practice concerning the law of the sea of
the [fifteen] member States of the European Union and of the European Community as
such,” see Treves, supra note 1, at 2. 
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THE UNITED STATES AND THE LAW OF THE SEA
CONVENTION: SLIDING BACK FROM ACCESSION
AND RATIFICATION*
John A. Duff**
I. INTRODUCTION
As of August 26, 2005, there were 149 parties to the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (“the Convention”).  States of all sorts,
with the most diverse interests in the oceans, from all parts of the globe, are
parties to the Convention.  For all the parties to the Convention virtually all
legal questions concerning the law of the sea are now governed by the
Convention.  Such questions are, in effect, questions of interpretation and
application of the Convention.1  While interpretation and application of
particular provisions may vary somewhat from one state to another, the
scope of such differences is confined by the fact that each party is working
from the same authoritative text.2  Also, as parties to the Convention, these
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3. But see United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Annex IX, art. 4, Dec. 10,
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397, which limits somewhat the extent of participation and rights of
the European Union under the Convention.
4. From the perspective of international law, the U.S. would become a party to the
Convention by “accession,” since it is not a signatory to it; and it would become a party to
the Implementation Agreement by “ratification,” as it is a signatory to that agreement.  From
the perspective of domestic U.S. law, however, the “advice and consent of the Senate” is
required before the President can make a treaty, which would thus be required for both
ratification and accession. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.  
states, as well as the European Union, the one international organization
that is a party,3 have rights to participate in the bodies established by the
Convention and related agreements.  The U.S., however, has not signed the
Convention, nor has it acceded to it, so it is not a state party.  It is,
therefore, not bound by the terms of the Convention and it may not
participate, absent some special arrangement, in the ongoing work of
Convention-related bodies.  In 1994, however, the U.S. signed a
subsequent, related agreement, the Agreement Relating to the
Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (“the Implementation Agreement”), which was intended to cure
certain defects in the Convention to allow the U.S., as well as other
industrialized nations, to become parties to it.4
In October 2003, during the 108th Congress (2003-2004), the U.S.
Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings to examine the question
of U.S. accession to the Convention and ratification of the accompanying
Implementation Agreement.  On February 25, 2004, the Committee voted
unanimously (19-0) to support U.S. accession/ratification and reported the
Convention and the Implementation Agreement to the full Senate for its
consideration.  On March 11, 2004, the Convention was placed on the
Senate schedule and became eligible for the final phase that would bring
the U.S. into state party membership.  At the adjournment of the 108th
Congress, the Convention had not been brought to a vote.  As a result the
Convention has slid back in the domestic “advice and consent” process and
must once again be considered by the Foreign Relations Committee before
it can be submitted to the full Senate.  In light of the United States’ twenty-
three year long desistance from ratification/accession, and particularly in
light of the failure to have the Convention brought to a vote in the Senate
in 2004, a number of questions merit examination. Why did the Senate
refrain from voting on the Convention? Are there any credible signs that
indicate U.S. ratification/accession is likely to occur soon? And, if the U.S.
remains “outside the Convention” how might it protect its global ocean
interests?
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5. HENRY KISSINGER, DIPLOMACY 38 (Simon & Schuster 1994). 
6. See the enormously influential ALFRED THAYER MAHAN, THE INFLUENCE OF SEA
POWER UPON HISTORY, 1660-1783 (Sagamore Press Inc. 1957) (1890). See also WALTER
LAFEBER, THE AMERICAN AGE: UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY AT HOME AND ABROAD
SINCE 1750 (W. W. Norton & Co. 1989) (describing Mahan as “perhaps the most influential
military strategist in U.S. history.” Id. at 175).
7. Truman Proclamation on the Continental Shelf, Presidential Proclamation No. 2667,
10 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (Sept. 28, 1945).  The Proclamation states: 
Now, Therefore, I, Harry S. Truman, President of the United States of America, do
hereby proclaim the following policy of the United States of America with respect to
the natural resources of the subsoil and sea bed of the continental shelf. Having
concern for the urgency of conserving and prudently utilizing its natural resources,
the Government of the United States regards the natural resources of the subsoil and
sea bed of the continental shelf beneath the high seas but contiguous to the coasts of
the United States as appertaining to the United States, subject to its jurisdiction and
control.  In cases where the continental shelf extends to the shores of another State,
or is shared with an adjacent State, the boundary shall be determined by the United
States and the State concerned in accordance with equitable principles.  The character
as high seas of the waters above the continental shelf and the right to their free and
unimpeded navigation are in no way thus affected.  Id.
For the first century of its existence, the U.S. used its waters and coasts
in a fashion similar to other maritime states.  The seas were employed as
marine highways, carrying people and goods in domestic and international
commerce.  Fishery resources were exploited.  Coastal areas were
developed to facilitate water dependent industries and to spur economic
expansion.
In the 1890s the U.S. embarked on an ambitious program to create a
powerful “battleship navy,”5 capable of projecting military power not only
in the Caribbean and Latin America, areas in which the U.S. had long
claimed a special interest, but also throughout Asia and beyond.6  From that
time to the present, as U.S. naval power and commercial and strategic
interests abroad expanded, the U.S. has regarded those aspects of the inter-
national law of the sea that impact military uses as having overriding
importance.  Its principal interests in this regard were to maximize freedom
of navigation for its naval vessels (and later freedom of overflight of ocean
areas for its military aircraft), and, to that end, to resist encroachments on
traditional freedom of the seas. 
In the 1890s, also, offshore oil and gas development began off the west
coast of the U.S. in the form of pier-based oil drilling.  As technology
rapidly developed in the 20th century it became apparent that vast sources
of economic goods and uses lay off the coasts of the U.S.  This realization
prompted President Truman to proclaim exclusive jurisdiction over the
resources on and below the continental shelf of the U.S. in 1945.7  This
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8. See ANN L. HOLLICK, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA, 117-20
(Princeton Univ. Press 1981).
9. H. Lauterpacht, Sovereignty Over Submarine Areas, 27 BR. Y.B. INT’L L. 376, 393-
94 (1950).
10. Apr. 29, 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 11.
11. Nov. 22, 1964, 516 U.N.T.S. 205.
12. Aug. 29, 1958, 499 U.N.T.S. 311.
13. Apr. 29, 1958, 559 U.N.T.S. 285.
claim served as a watershed in law of the sea doctrine in that it was based
more on contours and contiguity than on existing substantive legal
principles or practices.  The Proclamation did, however, fit into a
recognized method of international law development, i.e., the practice of
claim and response.  In this case, the U.S. claimed sovereignty over the
continental shelf and the international community could respond in roughly
one of two ways: rejection or acquiescence and adoption.  The latter path
was chosen and shortly after the U.S. claim was issued, maritime nations
around the globe issued similar claims.8  While the process of claim-and-
response often involves decades or centuries to fashion what becomes
accepted as customary international law, the practice of so many states
prompted one commentator to suggest that a customary international law
principle regarding continental shelf claims may have crystallized in as few
as four or five years.9
At about the same time, the end of the Second World War prompted the
international community to seek to codify international law in a large
number of areas under the auspices of the U.N.  The law of the sea was
selected as one of those areas.  Four multilateral treaties emerged from the
first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (now known as
UNCLOS I): the Convention on the High Seas,10 the Convention on the
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone,11 the Convention on the
Continental Shelf,12 and the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the
Living Resources of the High Seas.13  These treaties effectively split up
state interests in the oceans and codified certain rules, yet they remained
ambiguous in some areas and completely deficient in others.  Further, none
of the four conventions contained compulsory dispute resolution processes,
in spite of the fact that the use of ocean space and exploitation of ocean
resources was expanding rapidly and concomitantly, increased the
likelihood of conflict.  Efforts to close some of the gaps and clarify some
of the ambiguities via a second U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea
failed.
In November 1967, in a speech before the United Nations General
Assembly, Malta's Ambassador, Arvid Pardo, called the delegates’
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14. U.N. Doc. A/C1 PV.1515 (1967). See also Tullio Scovazzi, The Evolution of
International Law of the Sea: New Issues, New Challenges, 286 R.C.A.D.I. 39, 118-19
(2000).
15. U.N. Doc. A/C1 PV.1515 (1967).
16. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, LAW OF THE SEA: THE END GAME, n.2 (Mar.
1996), http://www.cia.gov/nic/special_endgame.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2006). 
17. Jon M. Van Dyke, Sharing Ocean Resources—In a Time of Scarcity and Selfishness,
in THE LAW OF THE SEA: THE COMMON HERITAGE AND EMERGING CHALLENGES (Harry N.
Scheiber, ed., 2000) (quoting Johnson).
18. 140 Cong. Rec. S10046 (daily ed. July 28, 1994).  Statement by Senator Pell
recounting the introduction of Senate Resolution 172 of 1967 calling for the negotiation of
a treaty to extend the international legal order for the oceans beyond the then-existing
international regime; and, Senate resolution 186 of 1967, advocating specific principles to
govern the activities of States in the exploration and exploitation of ocean space. 
19. See JOSEPH KALO ET AL., COASTAL AND OCEAN LAW 319 (2nd ed. 2002).
20. Id.
21. See generally REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON MARINE SCIENCE, ENGINEERING AND
RESOURCES, OUR NATION AND THE SEA—A PLAN FOR NATIONAL ACTION (1969).
attention to the potential wealth that lay on the ocean seabed.14  He
proposed that the seabed area beyond the jurisdictional boundaries of states
be declared the “common heritage of mankind” and that any resources
retrieved from that area ought to be shared in a fair and distributive
manner.15  Remarkably, similar statements had been uttered by U.S.
administrations over the course of the nation’s history.  In the early years
of the republic, John Adams noted that “the oceans and [their] treasures are
the common property of all men.”16  In 1966, President Lyndon Johnson
declared that “[w]e must ensure that the deep seas and the ocean bottoms
are, and remain, the legacy of all human beings.”17  In the U.S. Congress
one year later, Senator Claiborne Pell was advocating the formation of a
new framework governing the use of the seabed and its resources.18
By 1970, the U.N. General Assembly drafted a Conference Resolution,
which called for the convening of a new law of the sea conference and
established a Seabed Committee, which set the stage for what would
become the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS III).19   Negotiations for a comprehensive law of the sea treaty
began in 1973.20
In the U.S., there was bipartisan support for such a treaty.  Prompted
by the Stratton Commission Report in 1969,21 the Nixon administration
undertook a thorough review of U.S. policy on the use of the oceans.  In
1970, President Nixon proposed that all nations adopt as soon as possible
a treaty under which they renounced all national claims to the natural
resources of the seabed beyond the point where the high seas reach a depth
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22. Statement by President Nixon on United States Policy for the Seabed (May 23, 1970)
reprinted in NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA: DOCUMENTS – VOLUME II 751-52 (S.
Houston Lay, Robin Churchill & Myron Nordquist eds., 1973).
23. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. DOC.
A/CONF.62/122 (Oct. 7, 1982) reprinted in 21 INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 1261 (1982)
[hereinafter UNCLOS].
24. From its date of opening for signature in 1982, to the time of deposit of the sixtieth
ratification, only one industrialized state, Iceland, had ratified the Convention.
25. March 2, 1981. Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, reprinted
in DEP’T ST. BULL. (Apr. 1981).
26. Id.
27. Press Release, White House, U.S. Votes Against Law of the Sea Treaty (July 9, 1982)
(reprinted in  82 DEP’T ST. BULL. 71 (Aug. 1982).
28. UNCLOS, supra note 23, art. 309 (“No reservations or exceptions may be made to
this Convention unless expressly permitted by other articles of this Convention.”).
of 200 meters and agreed to regard these resources as the common heritage
of mankind.22
II. THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA:
INITIAL U.S. REACTIONS
A.  U.S. Objections to the Convention on the Law of the Sea
The Convention opened for signature in 1982.23  For the twelve years
following, Part XI—the deep seabed mining regime—proved to be the
primary impediment to ratification and accession by industrialized
nations.24  During the final negotiations of the Convention in 1982, the U.S.
raised a number of objections to Part XI concerning the institutional
framework that would govern deep seabed mining activities as well as the
commercial and economic principles that would reign.25  President Reagan
issued what amounted to an ultimatum regarding six specific issues, which
required resolution if the U.S. were to become a party to the Convention.26
Upon review of the final draft of the Convention, he determined that U.S.
objectives had not been met and that the U.S. would, therefore, not join the
Convention.27
Acceding to the Convention subject to reservations was not an option
open to the U.S. Readers of the voluminous Convention are well aware
that it does not allow for reservations,28 the means by which a state might
ordinarily opt out of or modify certain treaty provisions with respect to
their application to it.  Nonetheless, a state acceding to the Convention may
do so with a statement that includes a series of declarations and/or
understandings, so long as those statements do not functionally amount to
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29. UNCLOS, supra note 23, art. 310. A reservation is defined in the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, art. 2(1)(d), as “a unilateral statement, however phrased or named,
made by a State, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty,
whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty
in their application to that State.”  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 2(1)(d),
Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
30. For the text of the Committee’s suggested declarations and understandings, see the
Appendix to John A. Duff, A Note on the United States and the Law of the Sea: Looking
Back and Moving Forward, 35 OCEAN  DEV. & INT’L L. 195 (2004). See also Yann-Huei
Song, Declarations and Statements with Respect to the 1982 UNCLOS: Potential Legal
Disputes between the United States and China After U.S. Accession to the Convention, 36
OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 261 (2005).
31. Senate Advice and Consent to the Law of the Sea Convention: Hearing before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 108th Cong. 5 (Oct. 14, 2003) (testimony of John
Norton Moore, Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law) [hereinafter Moore
testimony].
32. William J. Aceves, The Freedom of Navigation Program: A Study of the Relationship
Between Law and Politics, 19 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 259, 277-78 n.102 (1996).
In 1976, Rumsfeld’s concerns were primarily related to excessive ocean claims that might
impede U.S. navigation:
As we enter the last quarter of the 20th Century, the legal and political restrictions
placed on freedom of mobility are changing the world and impacting on our strategic
mobility capability. Our position in the Law of the Sea negotiations stresses, among
other things, unimpeded transit through and over international straits. This principle
applies to surface movements as well as to overflight. Without this freedom, our
mobility and logistic resupply in future contingencies could be impeded. 
Id. (quoting Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Appropriations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
363 (1976)).
reservations.29  When the Foreign Relations Committee submitted the
Convention to the full Senate in 2004, it attached a set of suggested
declarations and understandings.30  Now that the Convention has been sent
back to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, however, it is
questionable whether it will emerge with declarations and understandings
identical to those suggested in 2004.
B.  Modification and “Reflection” 
Concerned that the Convention might garner the requisite participation
to bring it into force, President Reagan appointed Donald Rumsfeld as
Special Presidential Envoy on the Law of the Sea Treaty and assigned him
the task of dissuading other industrialized nations from ratifying the
Convention.31  As early as 1976, then Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld had
voiced concerns over the implications of a Convention that might fail to
protect U.S. interests.32  Commentators have noted that Mr. Rumsfeld’s
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33. David A. Colson, United States Accession to the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea, 7 GEO. INT’L ENV. L. REV. 651, 657 (1995).  
Some important allies such as the United Kingdom and Germany stood with the
United States . . . and withheld signature. Other allies, such as France, Japan, Italy,
Belgium, and the Netherlands signed, but made statements to the effect that
ratification would not occur until an acceptable solution was found to the [provisions
deemed deficient by the U.S.]. 
Id.
34. Hans J. Morgenthau, Political Limitations of the United Nations, in LAW AND
POLITICS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY 143, 150  (George A. Lipsky ed., 1953).
35. See The Secretary-General, Consultation of the Secretary-General on Outstanding
Issues Relating to the Deep Seabed Regime Provisions of the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea, ¶¶ 1-2, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/48/950 (June
9, 1994).
36. Id. at ¶¶ 4-28. 
37. Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations
Convention Law of the Sea, G.A. Res. 48/263, U.N. Doc.  A/RES/48/263 (Jul. 28, 1994),
efforts were effective in stalling a number of developed nations from
ratifying the Convention.33  The U.S. objections, along with the efforts of
the special envoy, impeded effective movement toward quick and/or
widespread acceptance of the Convention in the 1980s; yet the Convention
was open for signature and gaining ratification from a substantial number
of states, including a few industrialized nations.  The U.S., recognizing that
the Convention would eventually gain the sixty ratifications necessary to
bring it into force, and eager to benefit from some of the Convention’s pro-
visions, began a two-pronged effort to: 1) modify those provisions it
deemed objectionable, and 2) employ those provisions it deemed beneficial.
1.  U.S. Efforts to Modify the Convention 
“There is no such thing as the policy of an organization, international or
domestic, apart from the policy of its most influential member . . . .”34
In July 1990, U.N. Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar
acknowledged that there were problems with certain aspects of Part XI of
the Convention and that these problems were inhibiting some states from
accepting the Convention.35  As a result, the U.N. prompted a review of Part
XI to determine whether revision regarding the regime for the deep seabed
area (the “Area”) and its resources could bring about universal participation
in the Convention.  From 1990 to 1994 the U.N. coordinated efforts to
revise Part XI of the Convention.36
On July 28, 1994, those efforts came to fruition in the form of the
Implementation Agreement.37  The Implementation Agreement reflected
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available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N94/332/98/PDF/
N9433298.pdf?OpenElement [hereinafter Implementation Agreement].
38. Id.  at ¶ 6.
39. Signatories to the Implementation Agreement on July 29, 1994, were: Algeria,
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Cape Verde, China,
Denmark, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan,
Kenya, Luxembourg, Malta, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Paraguay, Poland,
Portugal, Seychelles, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States,
Uruguay, Vanuatu, and the European Community.  
40. Message from the President of the United States transmitting United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, with Annexes. The Convention was opened for signature
at Montego Bay, Dec. 10, 1982, and the Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part
XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of Dec. 10, 1982, with Annex,
was adopted at New York, July 28, 1994, and signed by the United States, subject to
ratification, on July 29, 1994. S. Treaty Doc. 39, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. IV (1994) [hereinafter
S. Treaty Doc. 103-39].
41. The message from President Clinton, supra note 40, noted that the Implementation
Agreement “fundamentally changes the deep seabed mining regime of the Convention . . .
and the Agreement is important to maintain a stable legal regime for all uses of the sea . . .
. [S]uch stability is vital to U.S. national security and economic strength.”
“political and economic changes, including in particular a growing reliance
on market principles . . . .”38  Forty-one states, including the U.S. and
twenty other industrialized nations, signed the Agreement on July 29,
1994.39  This arrangement allowed the U.S. to participate in the
organization and implementation of institutions within the International
Seabed Authority for a limited period.  That limited period has since
expired and the U.S. has not acceded to the Convention.  As a result, the
U.S. now finds itself on the outside looking in.  While the responsible
officials in the executive and legislative branches of government ponder the
merits and timeliness of ratification/accession, the courts are left to apply
an odd and often inconsistent mix of principles in cases that require the
application of ocean law doctrine.
On October 7, 1994, President Clinton forwarded the Implementation
Agreement and the Convention to the U.S. Senate for advice and consent,
a necessary step under U.S. law governing “domestic” ratification of
international treaties.40  In doing so, he noted that the Implementation
Agreement modified the Convention sufficiently to merit U.S. Senate
ratification.41  Senator Claiborne Pell, a staunch advocate of the
Convention, chaired the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at the time
and articulated his strong support of the Convention and the
Implementation Agreement.  Senator Pell stated that “[the] Convention and
the Agreement . . .  are the culmination of over two decades of efforts by
Democratic and Republican Administrations.  They are a triumph for
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42. 140 CONG. REC. 144, S. 14468 (Oct. 6, 1994).
43. Republican Ascendancy Dims Chances for Ratification of Law of Sea Treaty, BNA
Daily Report for Executives (Nov. 16, 1994) (citing statement by Senator Helms that he
would oppose the Convention and Implementation Agreement if the resulting deep seabed
mining regime restricts U.S. mining operations and free enterprise).
44. A summary of the defense, navigation, environmental, and commercial benefits that
the Convention would provide to the United States as stated in the Treaty Document, S.
Treaty Doc. 103-39, supra note 41, is provided in John Alton Duff, UNCLOS and the Deep
Seabed Mining Regime: The Risks of Refuting the Treaty, 19 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV.
1 (1995).
American foreign policy, and I will make their consideration one of my
highest priorities for the Committee on Foreign Relations in the 104th
Congress.42
But Senator Pell, a Democrat, never got the chance to bring his
influence to bear.  One month after making the above statement, elections
in the U.S. shifted control of the Senate to the Republicans, and with it the
control of congressional committees.  The new chair of the Foreign
Relations Committee, Senator Jesse Helms, signaled his displeasure with
the Convention and chose to refrain from holding hearings that might lead
to Senate consent to ratification.43
The limited period of participation that the U.S. enjoyed by signing the
Implementation Agreement in 1994 has since expired and the U.S. has not
yet ratified the Convention.  While numerous treaty supporters provided the
Senate with the national security, navigation, environmental, and
commercial bases for Convention ratification and accession in the 1990s,
Chairman Helms was unconvinced.44  The U.S. now embarked on a policy
of employing the Convention as a “mirror” to apply the beneficial terms of
the Convention.  Simply stated, the U.S. claims that certain law of the sea
principles found in the Convention inure to its benefit and apply to other
nations, not as treaty provisions per se, but rather as “reflections” of
customary international law.
2.  The Period of “Reflection” in the United States
The hesitancy to accede to the Convention has left the U.S. in a
somewhat confused state in terms of which law of the sea principles ought
to be employed in various lawmaking and policy-making efforts.  While the
Executive Branch of government regularly asserts that many, if not most,
of the Convention’s provisions are codifications of customary international
law, the Legislative Branch has (until very recently) been the impediment
to accession.  In cases where the U.S. courts have had to refer to law of the
sea principles to adjudicate cases (domestic and international in nature), the
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45. Territorial Sea of the United States of America, Presidential Proclamation No. 5928,
54 Fed. Reg. 777 (Jan. 9, 1989) (emphasis added).
46. Contiguous Zone of the United States, Presidential Proclamation No. 7219, 64 Fed.
Reg. 173 (Aug. 8, 1999) (emphasis added).
choice of which law to employ is by no means certain.  In the past ten
years, U.S. courts have applied provisions found in the 1982 Convention
(as “reflections of customary international law”), the various UNCLOS I
Conventions, and century-old case law.  As a result, the body of law
developing in the U.S. has a patchwork quality to it and lacks coherence.
As the negotiations leading to the adoption of the text of the 1982
Convention proceeded, it became readily apparent that many of the
principles in the 1958 Conventions would be replaced by new substantive
law and legal processes.  Faced with a new treaty to which it was not a
party, the U.S. embarked on a period of “reflection” that would allow it to
benefit from many of the Convention’s most important provisions without
actually joining.
In 1988, President Reagan claimed a twelve nautical mile territorial sea
for the U.S., not based upon the applicable 1958 Convention to which the
U.S. was a party, but upon the principles set forth in the 1982 Convention
on the Law of the Sea.  Importantly, however, his claim was not based on
the Convention per se, but rather was “[i]n accordance with international
law, as reflected in the applicable provisions of the 1982 [Convention].”45
Eventually, President Clinton would rely upon the treaty-as-mirror
metaphor when he claimed a U.S. Contiguous Zone in 1999, stating:
International law recognizes that coastal nations may establish
zones contiguous to their territorial seas, known as contiguous
zones . . . .  In accordance with international law, reflected in the
applicable provisions of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the
Sea, within the contiguous zone of the United States the ships and
aircraft of all countries enjoy the  high seas freedoms of navigation
and overflight and the laying of submarine cables and pipelines,
and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to those
freedoms, such as those associated with the operation of ships,
aircraft, and submarine cables and pipelines, and compatible with
the other provisions of international law reflected in the 1982
Convention on the Law of the Sea.46
When called upon to resolve disputes that have ocean or maritime
aspects, U.S. courts usually find it necessary to apply rules and principles
of international law.  Prior to the entry into force of the four UNCLOS I
conventions, U.S. courts looked to customary international law for such
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47. See, e.g., The Scotia, 81 U.S. 170 (1872); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
48. See, e.g., Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 872, 889 (1st Cir.
1979) (citing U.S. signing of the  Convention on the Continental Shelf as confirming U.S.
willingness to observe the traditional three-mile territorial sea limit notwithstanding its
assertion of jurisdiction over mineral wealth farther offshore); United States v. Warren, 578
F.2d 1058, 1064 n.4 (5th Cir. 1978) (citing art. 10 of the Convention on the High Seas as
authorizing parties to police their own vessels on the high seas); Treasure Salvors, Inc. v.
Unidentified Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 569 F.2d 330, 338 n.14 (5th Cir.
1978) (citing the Convention on the Continental Shelf, the Convention on the High Seas,
and the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone to define zones of
maritime jurisdiction); United States v. Mitchell, 553 F.2d 996, 1002 (5th Cir. 1977)
(referring to art. 14 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone to
define innocent passage in applying the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972); Warner
v. Dunlap, 532 F.2d 767, 768-69 (1st Cir. 1976) (referring to art. 7 of the Convention on the
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone to define the term “bay” in applying the Lighthouse
Act of 1789).
49. See, e.g., Martha’s Vineyard Scuba Headquarters, Inc. v. Unidentified Wreck and
Abandoned Steam Vessel, 883 F.2d 1059 at 1066. (1st Cir. 1987) (citing the Convention for
the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag state over a vessel on the high seas).
50. See, e.g., United States v. Alaska, 503 U.S. 569, 588 n.10 (1992); Barber v. Hawaii,
42 F.3d 1185, 1195-96 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Ramirez-Ferrer, 82 F.3d 1131, 1136
n.4 (1st Cir. 1996); Mayaguezanos por la Salud y el Ambiente v. United States, 198 F.3d
297, 304-05 n.14 (1st Cir. 1999); R.M.S. Titanic v. Haver, 171 F.3d 943, 965 (4th Cir.
1999); United States v. McPhee, 336 F.3d 1269, 1273 (11th Cir. 2003), (citing United States
Ocean Policy, statement by President Reagan, reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 464 (Mar. 10, 1983)).
51. See also Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F.Supp. 2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2002); United
States v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 24 F.Supp. 2d 155, 159 (D.P.R. 1997); Mansel v.
Baker Hughes, Inc., 203 F.Supp. 2d 745 (S.D. Tex. 2002); United States v. Best, 172
F.Supp. 2d 656 (D.V.I. 2001); Jacobson v. Kalama Services, 128 F.Supp. 2d 644 (D. Haw.
2000); United States v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 11 F.Supp. 2d 1358 (S.D. Fla. 1998);
Alejandre v. Cuba, 996 F.Supp. 1239 (S.D. Fla. 1997); Greenpeace, Inc. (U.S.A.) v. France,
946 F.Supp. 773 (C.D. Cal. 1996); O'Barry v. United States, 915 F.Supp. 345 (S.D. Fla.
1995).
rules and principles.47  Later, after their entry into force, these conventions
provided applicable law in many situations.48  After the adoption of the
1982 Convention, even before it entered into force, courts in many states,
including U.S. courts, relied on some of its provisions, not as applicable
governing law itself, but rather as codifying patterns of state practice
accepted as law.49  From the U.S. perspective, many of the provisions of the
Convention are mirrors that “reflect” customary international law.50  The
growing number of cases citing the 1982 Convention supports the notion
that U.S. courts will increasingly rely upon certain legal principles
“reflected” therein.51
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52. Barber v. Hawaii, 42 F.3d 1185, 1195-96 (9th Cir. 1994).
53. United States v. Ramirez-Ferrer, 82 F.3d at 1136 n.4.
54. Mayaguezanos por la Salud y el Ambiente v. United States, 198 F.3d at 304-05 n.14
(emphasis added), aff’g Mayaguezanos por la Salud y el Ambiente v. United States, 38
F.Supp. 2d 168 (D.P.R. 1999).
55. R.M.S. Titanic v. Haver, 171 F.3d at 965.  
56. Grupo Protexa, S.A. v. All American Marine Slip, 20 F.3d 1224 (3d Cir. 1994), aff’g
954 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1992), rev’g 753 F.Supp. 1217 (D.N.J. 1990).
57. Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F.Supp. 2d 1116, 1133 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (“Because
UNCLOS reflects customary international law, plaintiffs may base an ATCA claim on it.”
Id. at 1162).
As early as 1994, U.S. Courts of Appeal began citing the Convention
as a document that reflected international law of the sea principles, even
though the Convention itself did not apply to the U.S.  Less than three
weeks after the Convention entered into force (for ratifying and acceding
nations – but not for the U.S.) the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals relied, in
part, upon the “continuous and expeditious” clause of the Convention’s
innocent passage definition to resolve a dispute regarding mooring laws off
the coast of Hawaii.52  Two years later, the First Circuit Court of Appeals
cited several of the Convention’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ)
principles as applicable insofar as those principles were alluded to in U.S.
Presidential Proclamations.53  In 1999, the First Circuit again referred to the
applicability of certain provisions of the 1982 Convention, noting that
while “[t]he Convention has been signed by the President . . .  it has not yet
been ratified by the Senate.  Consequently, we refer to UNCLOS only to
the extent that it incorporates customary international law . . . . ”54  That
same year, the Fourth Circuit cited provisions of the 1982 Convention
regarding salvage law and high seas freedoms as binding, not as treaty law,
but as well-established customary law.55
U.S. courts may also refer to Convention provisions when they need to
ascertain applicable foreign law the interpretation of which depends on
Convention principles.  In a 1994 decision, for instance, the Third Circuit
referred to the Convention to determine whether Mexico had jurisdiction
to order the removal of a wreck located in its EEZ.56  In addition, U.S.
courts have referred to the Convention to determine whether a claim arises
under the Alien Tort Claims Act which provides that “[t]he district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations . . . . ”57
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, recently ruling on a case in
which the breadth of the territorial sea was an issue, noted that the “United
States generally recognizes the territorial seas of foreign nations up to
twelve miles,” citing a statement by President Reagan that “[t]he United
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58. United States v. McPhee, 336 F.3d 1269, 1273 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing United States
Ocean Policy, statement by President Reagan, 22 I.L.M. 464 (Mar. 10, 1983)).
59. In re J.W. Westcott Co., 266 F.Supp. 2d 601, 605 (E.D. Mich. 2003).  The court
employed the 1982 Convention’s definition of “international strait” to conclude
[inappropriately, in the view of the author] that the Detroit River is such a strait.  Id.  The
court based its decision on an application of an 1893 U.S. Supreme Court case that
characterized the Great Lakes as High Seas areas.  Had the 2003 court employed the 1982
Convention’s international straits provisions as well as the Convention’s jurisdictional
provisions (particularly regarding internal waters) it likely would have concluded that the
Detroit River is not an international strait.  
60. 503 U.S. 569, 588 n.10 (1992).  See generally W. MICHAEL REISMAN & GAYL S.
WESTERMAN, STRAIGHT BASELINES IN MARITIME BOUNDARY DELIMITATION 38-104 (1992)
(describing the baseline provisions of UNCLOS III and their interpretation).
61. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 18.  Although the United States is not
a party to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, it regards itself as under the
obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of a treaty which it has signed. 1
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 312(3)
(1987).   See generally Martin A. Rogoff, The International Legal Obligations of Signa-
tories to an Unratified Treaty, 32 MAINE L. REV.  263 (1980).  In 1983, the United Nations
General Assembly adopted a resolution calling upon states to refrain from actions that would
undermine the Law of the Sea Convention. G.A. Res. 59a, 38 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 47
(1983), at 48. 1 RESTATEMENT, supra at 178 (Reporters’ Notes).
States will recognize the rights of other states in the waters off their coasts,
as reflected in the [Convention].”58  A 2003 federal district court opinion
illustrates perhaps both the willingness of the U.S. courts to apply
Convention principles and the proper understanding (or lack thereof) to do
so appropriately.59  The U.S. Supreme Court, as well, has indicated its
willingness to look to the 1982 Convention as a mirror of generally
accepted international legal principles.  In United States v. Alaska, the
Court noted that “[t]he United States has not ratified [the Convention], but
has recognized that its baseline provisions reflect customary international
law.”60
Besides referring to certain provisions of the Convention as reflecting
customary international law, some U.S. courts have referred to it believing
that because the U.S. is actively considering accession to the Convention,
it has, in their view, an obligation “to refrain from acts which would defeat
the object and purpose of [the] treaty.”61  For example, in referring to
Article 230(2) of the Convention to determine whether the U.S. is limited
to imposing monetary damages on a foreign ship for dumping oil in the
U.S. territorial sea, a federal district court said:
Matters of pollution by foreign vessels within the territorial sea of
the United States are governed by UNCLOS.  Although the treaty
arising from the convention is currently pending ratification before
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62. United States v. Royal Caribbean Cruise Lines, Ltd., 24 F. Supp. 2d 155, 159 (D.
P.R. 1997). See also Mansel v. Baker Hughes, Inc. 203 F. Supp. 2d 745, 746 (S.D.Tex.
2002) (referring to the obligation of the United States not to defeat the object and purpose
of a treaty to which it is has not yet ratified); Mayaguezanos por la Salud y el Ambiente v.
United States, 198 F.3d 297, 304 n.14 (1st Cir. 1999) (citing art. 18 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties as “reflecting customary international law.”).
63. United States v. Best, 304 F.3d 308 (3d Cir. 2002), rev’g United States v. Best, 172
F. Supp. 2d 656 (D. Virgin Islands 2001). 
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See, e.g., United States  v. Roberts, 1 F. Supp. 2d 601, 606 (E.D. La. 1998); United
States v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1372 (S.D.Fla. 1998).
the Senate, it nevertheless carries the weight of law from the date
of its submission by the President to the Senate. See Article 19
[sic] of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The
submission of the treaty to the Senate expresses to the international
community the United States’ ultimate intention to be bound by the
pact. Pending a treaty’s rejection or ratification by the Senate
under Article 18 of the Vienna Convention, the United States is
bound to uphold the purpose and principles of the agreement to
which the executive has tentatively made the United States a
party.62
Courts have encountered difficulties, however, in referring to
provisions of the 1982 Convention.  Sometimes it is unclear whether the
principles of the 1982 Convention should be referred to at all, even as
“reflections” of customary international law.  For instance, in 2002, a U.S.
federal circuit court ruled that a defendant was not protected by law of the
sea principles regarding foreign vessel seizure based on the fact that the
defendant’s flag state and the U.S., although both were parties to law of the
sea treaties, were not both parties to the same treaties.63  The court reasoned
that while the U.S. was a party to the 1958 Conventions (Convention on the
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone and the Convention on the High Seas)
that might have afforded the defendant some protection, the flag state of the
vessel (Brazil) and the national state of the defendant (Guyana) were not.64
Alternatively, the court ruled that although the 1982 Convention on the
Law of the Sea might have afforded the defendant similar protection, it did
not apply since Brazil was a party to that treaty but the U.S. was not.65
Courts have also acknowledged the problems associated with applying
certain provisions of the Convention that are not self-executing and
therefore would ordinarily require enabling legislation.66  For instance, a
federal district court in Louisiana refused to apply Articles 91 and 92 of the
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67. United States v. Roberts, 1 F. Supp. 2d at 606 (citing United States v. Postal, 589
F.2d 862, 875-76 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that comparable provisions of the 1958
Convention on the High Seas were not self-executing)).  See also United States v. Delgado-
Garcia, 374 F.3d 1337, 1342 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (refusing to apply the 1958 Convention on
the High Seas by narrowly interpreting the term “jurisdiction” in article 6(1)).
68. Benson v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 859 So. 2d 1213 (Fla. 3 Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
69. Backus v. State, 864 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. 4 Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (reh’g denied Feb. 19,
2004).
Convention (concerning the nationality of ships and the jurisdiction of
states over ships on the high seas), even as reflections of customary inter-
national law, because “they are not self-executing . . . [t]hus requir[ing]
implementing legislation before they may be enforced in the courts by
individuals.”67
Inconsistency in application of Convention principles is also a problem.
A recent pair of Florida state court cases illustrates the discrepant manner
in which law of the sea principles have been applied by U.S. courts.  In
November 2003, a Florida Appeals Court (Third District) ruled that
Florida’s state ocean jurisdiction is coterminous with a twelve-mile U.S.-
claimed territorial sea sufficient to bring a cruise ship doctor within state
jurisdiction on a medical malpractice charge alleged to have taken place
11.7 nautical miles from Florida’s shore.68  One month later, another
Florida Appeals Court (Fourth District) ruled that a defendant crossed the
U.S. border when he navigated more than three nautical miles (but less than
twelve) beyond Florida’s coast, and in so doing engaged in activity
exempted from the U.S. Constitution’s Fourth Amendment protection
against unwarranted searches.69
III. LAW OF THE SEA POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM
“REFLECTION” TO REALITY
The reason that the U.S. has maintained and endured its “period of
reflection” lies in part in politics.  As noted above, the U.S. Senate has
significant power in determining whether the Convention will become U.S.
law as treaty law (rather than a reflecting device).  Within the Senate, no
action can be taken until the Foreign Relations Committee holds hearings,
reviews the implications of the Convention and Implementation Agreement,
and forwards them to the full Senate for a vote.  As most other
industrialized states have moved forward in their efforts to join the ranks
of the Convention, the U.S. Senate conspicuously ignored the Convention
until 2003.  The sentiment of the presiding Chair of the Foreign Relations
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70. Press Release from Senator Lugar on Pew Oceans Commission Study (June 4, 2003)
(on file with author).
We face a substantial threat to our standard of living from the growing environmental
threat facing our oceans.  Over-fishing, climate change, and pollution point to a
global challenge reminiscent of the challenge we face in securing and destroying
weapons of mass destruction.  And there is one more nexus I want to touch on.  Last
year, I visited the Kola Peninsula in the Barents Sea, where I observed almost 200
former Soviets nuclear submarines scattered around miles of bays and inlets.  Many
of these subs are starting to sink. Experts predict that if any one of these subs does
sink, a nuclear reactor in that submarine could trigger substantial leakage of
radioactive material into the seas.  This is serious business.  I look forward to working
with my House and Senate colleagues to continue to address these mutual
environmental and global security threats with comprehensive measures.  
71. The witnesses scheduled to speak at the hearing included: Senator Ted Stevens of
Alaska (Chairman Committee on Appropriations); Senator John McCain (Chairman
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation); Admiral James D. Watkins, USN
(Ret.) (Chairman, U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy); Admiral Joseph Prueher, USN (Ret.);
Professor John Norton Moore (Director, Center for Oceans Law and Policy, University of
Virginia School of Law, Charlottesville, Va.); and Professor Bernard Oxman (University of
Miami, School of Law, Coral Gables, Fla).
Committee for most of the period from 1994-2003, Senator Helms, can
fairly be described as “why bother?”.  Many in the U.S., including Senator
Helms, operated under an assumption that the U.S. could exercise many, if
not most, of the rights outlined in the Convention by employing the treaty-
as-mirror metaphor.  
Two recent changes have prompted the shift in U.S. policy regarding
treaty accession from “why bother?” to “whether?” to “when?”:  September
11, 2001 and the retirement of Senator Helms.  The terrorist attacks
directed the attention and resources of the U.S. to issues of security.  The
transition in leadership on the Foreign Relations Committee from a vocal
opponent of most things related to the U.N. to a chairman with a long
history of “internationalist” work, created the opportunity to hold treaty
ratification hearings. 
A. The 2003 Senate Committee Hearings
The current Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Senator Richard Lugar, has highlighted the need for comprehensive
multilateral efforts to address ocean-based environmental and national
security threats.70  In October 2003, Senator Lugar convened hearings to
begin the Senate’s Convention ratification process.71  Lugar’s opening
statement indicated his intention to “begin work on a resolution of advice
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72. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea: Hearing Before Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, 108th Cong. (Oct. 14, 2003) (opening statement by Senator Richard Lugar)
[hereinafter Senator Lugar, Opening Statement].
73. Id. at 1. 
74. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea: Hearing, Before Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, 108th Cong. 5 (Oct. 21, 2003) (testimony of Mark T. Esper, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Negotiations Policy).
75. Id. at 1.
76. Id. at 2.
77. Id.
and consent” that is necessary for U.S. accession to the Convention.72
Senator Lugar emphasized the need for U.S. accession in the context of
global security and leadership: “More than 140 nations are party to the Law
of the Sea Convention, including all other permanent members of the U.N.
Security Council and all but two other NATO members.”73  Over the course
of two separate hearings, the Foreign Relations Committee heard from a
host of lawmakers, academics, senior level cabinet officials, business
leaders, nongovernmental organizations, and security and military experts.
To a person they advocated swift Senate consideration of the Convention
and accession to the Convention.  The statements made at the two hearings
outline the wide-ranging interest in supporting accession to the Convention.
Those interests are outlined below.
1.  The National Security/Defense Perspective.  
As already noted, Donald Rumsfeld played a key role in stopping the
U.S.’s and other nations’ treaty ratification efforts in the 1980s.  It is a
compelling point, therefore, to note that Secretary Rumsfeld’s Defense
Department now urges accession to the Convention.  On October 21, 2003,
a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense testified that the Convention is
“critical to the United States Armed Forces.”74  Defense Department
support for accession was based in part on navigation rights deemed
“critical to military operations” and “essential to the formulation and
implementation of [U.S.] national security strategy.”75  While some have
contended that these and other law of the sea rights could be exercised
employing the “reflection” approach, the Defense Department identified
certain additional benefits that would come only with accession, including
participation in international maritime fora and Convention-established
entities.76  Participation, noted the Defense Department representative,
would allow the U.S. to “prevent the erosion of navigational rights and
freedoms . . .  [and work toward] international consensus proscribing the
maritime trafficking of weapons of mass destruction.”77  While
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79. See UNCLOS, supra note 23, Part XV, art. 298.
80. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea: Hearing Before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, 108th Cong. 2 (Oct. 21, 2003) (testimony of Admiral Michael G.
Mullen, U.S. Navy, Vice Chief of Naval Operations).
81. Id. at 6.
82. Id. at 7-8.
83. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea: Hearing Before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, 108th Cong. 2 (Oct. 21, 2003) (testimony of Rear Admiral John E.
Crowley, Jr.).
recommending Convention accession, the Defense Department did identify
a number of issues that it deemed worthy of Senate attention.  One of these
will be noted here.  
While the Convention explicitly allows a state party to declare that
certain conflicts will not be subject to the Convention’s dispute resolution
processes, those exceptions are narrow.  Article 198(b) allows a state party
to effectively insulate “military activities” from Convention jurisdiction.
Concerned that an adverse party might seek the Convention’s application
to a U.S. activity by characterizing it as non-military, the Department of
Defense recommended that accession to the Convention be conditioned
upon “the understanding that each Party [to the Convention] has the
exclusive right to determine which of its activities are ‘military activities’
and that such determinations are not subject to review.”78  This condition
would protect a state party from becoming subject to a Convention-based
dispute resolution tribunal if the military activity claim/exemption to such
a tribunal were called into question.79
Speaking on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael G.
Mullen reiterated the concerns raised by others in the defense community
and agreed that the “military activities” exemption condition was of
paramount importance in a U.S. move toward accession.  The Admiral also
agreed that accession was warranted.   “Military operations since Septem-
ber 11 . . .  have dramatically increased [U.S.] global military require-
ments.”80  In particular, Mullen noted that U.S. military operations relied
upon “[t]he right of transit passage through international straits and the
related regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage.”81  While maintaining that
those rights were available to the U.S. under customary international law,
he contended that “as a party to the Convention, the United States would
. . . be in a stronger leadership position to assert its rights.”82
From the Department of Homeland Security perspective, Rear Admiral
John E. Crowley, Jr. testified that “public order of the oceans is best
established and maintained by a stable, universally accepted law of the sea
treaty reflective of U.S. national interest.”83  This testimony also alluded to
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84. Id.
85. Id. 
86. Id. at 3.  See United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances, December 20, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 493 (1989).  See also Michael A.
Becker, The Shifting Public Order of the Oceans: Freedom of Navigation and the
Interdiction of Ships at Sea, 46 HARV. INT’L L. J. 131, 167-211 (2005) (analyzing the
lawfulness of ship interdiction under the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea).
87. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea: Hearing Before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, 108th Cong. 3 (Oct. 21, 2003) (testimony of Rear Admiral John E.
Crowley, Jr.).
88. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea: Hearing Before Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, 108th Cong. 1 (Oct. 21, 2003) (testimony of John F. Turner, Assistant Secretary,
Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs) (emphasis added).
the importance of being part of a global law of the sea rulemaking process.
The Convention’s navigation freedoms and protections, noted Crowley,
“allow the use of the world’s oceans to meet changing national security
requirements,” suggesting that a non-state party would be at a disadvantage
in fashioning what might be considered new ocean-borne security efforts.84
Another significant benefit in becoming a state party to the Convention,
noted Admiral Crowley, would be the enhanced “ability to conduct . . .
interdiction operations and to refute excessive maritime claims.”85  Some
U.S. efforts in the past had been questioned by states contending that
certain treaty-based rights were not reflections of customary international
law.  Crowley also cited Convention Article 108 (requiring international
cooperation in the suppression of illegal drugs) as a means by which the
U.S. could hasten the implementation of the United Nations Convention
Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotic Substances.86
Finally, the Department of Homeland Security support for accession
highlighted the wide-ranging responsibilities charged to one of its core
functional components, the U.S. Coast Guard.  Accession, noted the
statement, would augment the Coast Guard’s ability to prevent, reduce, and
control maritime pollution; purge U.S. waters of substandard ships; and
preserve high seas fisheries.87
2.  The Diplomatic Perspective
Assistant Secretary of State John F. Turner cited the urgency for
accession at the outset of his testimony: “there are important reasons for the
United States to become a party to this Convention and to do so now.”88
Not surprisingly, the State Department highlighted accession as a means of
maintaining U.S. leadership in global matters, contributing to the ongoing
evolution of international lawmaking, and supporting peaceful methods of
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90. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea: Hearing Before Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, 108th Cong. 4 (Oct. 21, 2003) (testimony of Joseph J. Cox, President and CEO
of Chamber of Shipping of America) [hereinafter Cox testimony]. 
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 2. See also Christopher P. Mooradian, Protecting “Sovereign Rights”: The
Case for Increased Coastal State Jurisdiction over Vessel-Source Pollution in the Exclusive
Economic Zone, 82 B.U. L. REV. 767, 780-94 (2002) (analyzing the bases for coastal state
jurisdiction over vessel-source pollution in the exclusive economic zone under the 1982
international dispute resolution.  In an effort to perhaps illustrate the dwind-
ling opportunity to portray the U.S. as being at the forefront, Turner
explained, “[a]s of today, 143 parties, including most of our major allies,
have joined the Convention.  It is time for us to take the opportunity to
demonstrate U.S. leadership on oceans issues by becoming a party to the
Law of the Sea Convention.”89
3.  A Commercial Shipping Perspective
One commercial navigation voice raised during the committee hearings
was that of the Chamber of Shipping of America (CSA), an association of
U.S. vessel owners and operators of U.S. and foreign-flag ships.  CSA
president Joseph Cox made the case for accession based on environmental
and freedom of navigation principles.  Remaining outside the Convention,
cautioned Cox, put U.S.-based shipping interests in jeopardy of being
burdened by coastal state regulations that have been “stretching the
interpretations of the law of the sea into unrecognizable forms.”90  Cox
referred specifically to recent actions taken off the coast of Western
Europe.  He lambasted the forcible removal of the Prestige in 2002 from
the EEZ of Spain when it developed a hull fracture and sought entry into
safe waters.91  Cox also criticized a recent designation of a large expanse
of ocean stretching from the “upper reaches of the English Channel to the
Straits of Gibraltar [as] a particularly sensitive sea area [(PSSA)].”92  While
coastal states may designate PSSAs pursuant to International Maritime
Organization principles, acknowledged Cox, he contended that the
designation in this instance was unsubstantiated.93
Identifying the important interplay between the Convention and other
shipping and maritime organizations and agreements, Cox urged the
Foreign Relations Committee to ratify the Convention and another treaty
instrument awaiting Senate action, Annex VI of the Convention to Prevent
Pollution from Ships.94  Annex VI, which entered into force on May 19,
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Convention on the Law of the Sea).
95. International Maritime Organization, Annex VI of MARPOL 73/78 Regulations for
the Prevention of Air Pollution from Ships and NOx Technical Code (1998).
96. For a more detailed technical explanation of Annex VI, see A.A. Wright,
International Exhaust Emission Controls, MARPOL Annex VI, paper presented at American
Society o f Mech an ica l  En gin eer s  Co n feren ce  (Oct .  1999) ,  a t
http://www.asme.org/divisions/ice/links/oct99conf_WRIGHT2.pdf.
97. Cox testimony, supra note 90, at 2-3.
98. Hearing Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Five Treaties, 109th
Cong. (2005) (opening statement by Senator Richard G. Lugar).
99. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea: Hearing Before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, 108th Cong. 3 (Oct. 14, 2003) (testimony of Bernard Oxman,
Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law). See also Bernard H. Oxman, The
2005, regulates air pollution from ships.95  In particular, it limits sulphur
oxide (SOx) and nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions from ship exhausts and
prohibits deliberate emissions of ozone-depleting substances.96  Annex VI
merited prompt consideration, noted Cox, for familiar reasons—i.e., that
the U.S. had played a key role in fashioning the provisions of Annex VI;
that the Annex was quickly approaching the requisite number of
ratifications that will bring it into force; and that remaining on the outside
of an operating international maritime treaty would place the U.S. and its
shipping interests at a significant disadvantage in terms of the application
and interpretation of important law of the sea principles.97  In September
2005, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on the merits
of ratifying Annex VI.98
4.  The Academic Perspective
A number of academics gave testimony at the Foreign Relations
Committee hearings, including Professors Bernard Oxman and John Norton
Moore, both of whom had direct experience in the negotiations that
culminated in the Convention.  Oxman, who also has the distinction of
having served as an appointed ad hoc judge on the International Tribunal
for the Law of the Sea, recounted the historical leadership role played by
the U.S. in fashioning law of the sea principles.  With the insight of one
who has worked from outside as well as inside the Convention, its creation,
and its apparatus, he pointed out the weakness of claiming law of the sea
rights as customary rights: “The fundamental truth is that the most difficult
and potentially costly policy decisions made by the President and Congress
regarding activities at sea turn not on what our own lawyers say our rights
are under the law of the sea, but what foreign states perceive our rights to
be.”99
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Professor Moore’s testimony complemented that of his academic
colleague and noted particular practical benefits that the U.S. could gain
upon accession, including: a seat on the Council of the International Seabed
Authority; a role in the next election of judges to serve on the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea; the election of a U.S. expert to the
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf; direct participation in
the annual meeting of the states parties to the Convention; and augmented
authority and increased mechanisms for contesting illegal ocean claims.100
5.  The Senate’s Perspective and an Eye Toward Continental Shelf
Delimitation
While the Foreign Relations Committee has the responsibility of
reviewing and recommending treaties to the full Senate, other Senate
committees also play significant roles in the ultimate accession to the
Convention and implementation of its provisions.  In a deft nod to these
committees, their roles and their leadership, Senator Lugar emphasized the
fact that U.S. accession to the Convention was “supported by the chairmen
of the Appropriations and Commerce Committees.”101  The former exerts
considerable influence in decisions related to the funding of U.S. policy
efforts, while the latter would play a significant role in shepherding
legislation through Congress that would be needed to allow implementation
of the Convention’s provisions.102
The Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, Senator Ted
Stevens, signaled his support for accession and highlighted some of the
proximate benefits to his own state of Alaska.  Stevens pointed to the
Convention’s constraints on high seas fishing designed to protect coastal
states from deleterious fishing practices.103  He also highlighted the
particular interest his constituents have in matters related to continental
shelf claims, noting that two-thirds of the U.S. continental shelf is situated
off Alaska.104  Stevens pointed to recent continental shelf claims by Russia
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that merited monitoring and suggested that the Convention’s provisions on
continental shelf delimitation would support a U.S. claim of approximately
sixty-two thousand square kilometers north and east of the Bering Strait.105
Article 76 of the Convention provides a basis upon which a coastal state
may claim a juridical continental shelf, in excess of the geologic shelf,
based on a complex determination of, inter alia, the extent of  “the natural
prolongation of [the coastal state’s] land territory to the outer edge of the
continental margin.”106
A U.S-funded mapping and hydrographic study designed to identify
regions where Convention-based extended continental shelf claims might
be made, indicates that the U.S. is preparing for when it can make such
claims as a state party to the Convention.107  While the study does not
purport to constitute an Article 76 claim, it focuses attention on the fact
that, for some time, U.S industries have been looking beyond the 200
nautical mile mark for opportunities to develop natural resources. 
The U.S. refusal to accede to the Convention in 2004 has not hindered
its activities regarding Article 76 continental shelf boundary delimitation
research.  Researchers at the Center for Coastal and Ocean Mapping/Joint
Hydrographic Center at the University of New Hampshire continue to
analyze data collected on numerous research cruises that might ultimately
be used to substantiate continental shelf claims pursuant to Article 76 of the
Convention on the Law of the Sea.  That research suggests that there are
expansive areas off the northeast coast of the U.S., in the Gulf of Alaska,
in the Bering Sea, and in the Arctic region that might be claimed by the
U.S. pursuant to Article 76 principles.108
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6.  The Industrial Perspective
The Foreign Relations Committee heard testimony from Paul Kelly, on
behalf of petroleum and other industrial associations, advocating
Convention accession as a means of facilitating energy development on the
continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles.  While the Convention allows
for continental shelf claims to 350 miles and in some cases even beyond
this, as a non-state party, the U.S. has no treaty-based means of making
such a claim.  Kelly painted a picture of an energy industry ready, willing,
and capable of moving oil and gas extraction production into deepwater
areas beyond 200 nautical miles of the U.S.109  Citing technology that now
allows for oil and gas development in water depths approaching two
kilometers, Kelly pointed out that “U.S. companies are interested in setting
international precedents by being the first to operate in areas beyond 200
miles and to continue demonstrating environmentally sound drilling
development and production technologies.”110  While Kelly touted the
ambitious and environmentally-sound plans of industry, the environmental
community had its own advocate citing the myriad reasons for acceding to
the Convention.
7.  The Environmental Perspective
Most of the testimony given before the Foreign Relations Committee
referenced the environmental benefits that the U.S., and the oceans
themselves, would obtain through near-universal accession to the
Convention.  One presenter, however, raised environmental implications as
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a principal concern.  Roger Rufe, a former U.S. Coast Guard Vice Admiral,
spoke in his capacity as the president of a large nongovernmental
organization dedicated to ocean conservation issues.111
Rufe detailed not only the benefits, in the form of U.S leadership in
exporting sound marine environmental practices, but the pitfalls that
merited consideration as well.112  He cautioned that certain of the Conven-
tion’s ambiguities might be employed as shields against the enforcement of
U.S. domestic environmental laws.113  Rufe identified a series of Conven-
tion issues that warranted interpretive statements to ensure that
environmental protections would not be subordinated or suborned.114  After
detailing the environmental concerns and suggesting a means of mitigating
or remedying them, Rufe went on to note that his organization was a strong
supporter of accession to the Convention.115
8.  The Committee Hearings: Aftermath
On February 25, 2004, the Committee voted unanimously (19-0) to
support U.S. accession and reported the Convention and the Implementa-
tion Agreement to the full Senate for its consideration.  On March 11, 2004,
the Convention was placed on the Senate schedule and became eligible for
the final step that would bring the U.S. into state party membership.
In a somewhat unusual turn of events, additional Senate and House
committees requested hearings on the Convention before any Senate vote
might be held.  On March 23, 2004, public hearings were held before the
Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works.  On April 8, 2004,
the Senate Armed Services Committee held hearings.  On May 12, 2004,
the House Committee on International Relations held hearings on the
Convention, and on June 8, 2004, the Senate Select Intelligence Committee
held closed hearings.  Opponents of Convention accession continued to
raise concerns about implications of the Convention for, among other
things, U.S. sovereignty, and the specter of an international taxing
authority.   
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In an effort to stop the Convention from being derailed, Senator
Richard Lugar, Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, issued
a series of twenty letters to his Senate colleagues between February and
July 2004 pointing out the reasons for Convention accession and refuting
the claims of opponents.116  Lugar also posted a series of Frequently Asked
Questions on his Senate website highlighting, among other things, the
reasons for prompt accession to the Convention.117
The road to accession seemed to gain another boost in the fall of 2004.
In September  2004, the congressionally-created and presidentially-
appointed U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy stated unambiguously that
“[t]he United States should accede to the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea.”118  The Commission Report highlighted the reasons for
that recommendation:
International bodies established under the LOS Convention are in
the process of making decisions that directly affect important U.S.
interests.  For example, the Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf is considering jurisdictional claims over
resources on the continental margin, an area of particular
importance to the United States with its broad continental margin
rich in energy resources. Measures to guide the future exploration
and exploitation of deep seabed resources under the Convention
are also being developed.  The Convention will no doubt continue
to evolve.  In 2004, the Convention will be open for amendment by
its parties for the first time.  If the United States is to ensure that its
interests as a maritime power and coastal state are protected, it
must participate in this process.  The best way to do that is to
become a party to the Convention, and thereby gain the right to
place U.S. representatives on its decision-making bodies.119
President Bush’s response to the Commission recommendation in
December 2004 indicated that the administration agreed: “As a matter of
national security, economic self-interest, and international leadership, the
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Bush Administration is committed to U.S. accession to the U.N. Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea.”120
Despite the Foreign Relations Committee’s unanimous support for the
Convention, Chairman Lugar’s efforts to shepherd it through the domestic
ratification process, the U.S. Ocean Commission’s recommendation, and
the President’s commitment, the full Senate refrained from holding a vote
on Convention accession.  When the term of the 108th Congress expired at
the end of 2004, so too did the Convention’s place on the Senate schedule.
While the U.S. Constitution merely states that the Senate’s role in
treaty ratification is to give its “advice and consent,” a detailed set of
Senate rules governs the manner in which that process takes place.  Treaties
may linger in the “advice and consent” pipeline for years.  Even if a treaty
has made substantial progress through the Senate process, it may be subject
to significant backsliding.  Figure 1 illustrates the progress that the
Convention and Implementation Agreement made through March 2004,
when the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s Resolution of Advice and
Consent was placed on the Senate Schedule for consideration.121  But the
Senate did not consider the Resolution during the remainder of the 108th
Congress.  As a result, at the adjournment of the 108th Congress, the
Convention and Implementation Agreement were returned to the Foreign
Relations Committee.
According to Senate Rule XXX, “[A]ll proceedings on treaties shall
terminate with the Congress, and they shall be resumed at the
commencement of the next Congress as if no proceedings had previously
been had thereon.”122  Accordingly,  the Convention and Implementation
Agreement lost much of the progress they had made and slid back to an
early stage of in the process.123  The hearings in support of ratification have
been effectively nullified and the unanimous Committee vote is now only
of historical interest.  The draft Declarations and Understandings that
accompanied the treaty document on the Senate Schedule are likewise
nullified.  The Convention documents must again be considered by the
Foreign Relations Committee, presumably meaning that new hearings must
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be held, and again receive a favorable vote by the Committee before they
may be placed on the Senate Schedule for consideration by the full Senate.
If the Committee does hold hearings, there is no guarantee that the
Convention will secure the same level of support it received in 2004.  The
composition of the Committee has changed since 2004, and it is even
possible that some remaining members may view the matter differently
given the passage of time and the opposition voiced by those who consider
accession contrary to U.S. interests. 
Although the Convention suffered a setback with the adjournment of
the 108th Congress, the Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
has continued to solicit support for accession.  In a series of questions to
the nominee for the position of U.S. Secretary of State, Senator Richard
Lugar suggested that the Bush administration ought to support the domestic
ratification process in the Senate and that the Senate should again consider
Convention accession. 
During her confirmation hearings regarding her nomination to the post
of U.S. Secretary of State in January, 2005, Dr. Condoleeza Rice
recommended just such action.  She indicated that the President would like
to see the Convention “pass as soon as possible.”124  Furthermore, in a
written response to a question regarding Convention accession, Dr. Rice,
on behalf of the Bush Administration, “urge[d] the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee to again favorably report out the Convention and the
Implementation Agreement,” adding that “the Administration [would] work
with the Senate leadership to bring the Convention and the Implementation
Agreement to a floor vote in the 109th Congress.”125  Nonetheless, the
Foreign Relations Committee has yet to convene any hearings or schedule
any votes on the Convention during the current Congress.
9.  The Remnants of Opposition.
While there have been few, if any, public statements of opposition
voiced by members of the Senate, Convention opposition still exists in the
hearts, minds, and statements of a number of long-time Convention
adversaries.  
Followers of the United States’ stance on the Convention over the years
will recall that the strongest opposition to the Convention was raised by the
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Reagan administration in the 1980s.  Less than six weeks after taking
office, President Reagan ordered a comprehensive review of U.S. policy on
the law of the sea and the then draft Convention.126  One year later, as the
Convention was being completed after a decade of negotiation (led in great
part by the U.S. delegation), President Reagan deemed a significant portion
of Part XI (the deep seabed mining regime) “unacceptable.”127  A host of
commentators joined Reagan in declaring the Convention to be, in toto,
adverse to important U.S. interests.128  While significant changes were
made to Part XI via a virtual rewriting in the form of the Implementation
Agreement, the Convention seemed eternally stigmatized by Part XI’s
earlier characterization as “ocean resource socialism.”  
While the Implementation Agreement modifications to Part XI
addressed President Reagan’s objections, the changes did not seem to
crystallize a pro-Convention constituency capable of moving the U.S.
towards accession.129  As noted above, changes in U.S. security priorities
and a change in the Foreign Relations chairmanship seemed to be the two
greatest factors prompting the Executive Branch to support accession and
the Senate to entertain that support in the form of committee hearings.  
A handful of opponents continue to voice their concerns about the
impact of accession on U.S. sovereignty and security.  Doug Bandow, a
special assistant to President Reagan in the 1980s who served on the U.S.
delegation to the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, continues
to call for the scuttling of the Convention.130  Bandow continues to caution
against what he refers to as a “redistributionist bent” embodied in Part XI
in the form of a portion of deep seabed royalties being distributed to mining
and non-mining nations alike.  He also notes that the U.S. ought to stand
against the creation of a “new oceans bureaucracy.”131  At the same time,
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he derides the advocates’ call for Convention accession as a means of
manifesting U.S. leadership.  Leadership, suggests Bandow, can be
illustrated just as easily by saying “no” as saying “yes.”  
Bandow’s arguments, however, fail to carry the same weight today as
they might have ten years ago.  The “oceans bureaucracy,” as he calls it, is
not a development that might be stemmed.  The Law of the Sea Tribunal is
up and running.  Judges have been appointed and are hearing and
adjudicating cases.  The Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
has been established and is employing Convention principles to delineate
and reconcile continental shelf claims.132  The U.S. is currently engaged in
mapping its own continental shelf employing Convention principles.133
Another Convention opponent contends that the Convention still
contains a number of “fatal flaws” that ought to stop the U.S. from
acceding.  Washington Times columnist Frank J. Gaffney, Jr. suggests that
Convention accession will hinder U.S. intelligence-gathering activities that
are vital to the country.134  He also suggests that Convention-based
adjudication of conflicts might emasculate U.S. military and defense
initiatives.135  These types of concerns were addressed comprehensively in
the Committee hearings and continue to be effectively refuted by
responsive commentaries penned by advocates of accession such as
Admiral W. L. Schacte.136
Still others suggest that the Convention was voted out of Committee in
the dark of night, that Senator Lugar prevented other Senators from seeing
the whole Convention,137 and that the Convention would give the U.N.
“absolute control” over any type of ocean research and exploration
activity.138  Many of these charges can be quickly dispelled by reviewing
the process that has been employed in scheduling and holding the
Committee hearings or by looking around for the thousands of dog-eared
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copies of the full Convention that were printed by the U.S. Government
Printing Office and distributed to the Senate in 1994.  Nonetheless, some
ocean policy devotees suggest that the specter of Senator Helms’ opposition
to the Convention still carries weight in Washington.139
B.  What Is Next?: The Gulf of Mexico and the Western Gap Example 
The remaining question is “when?”  Or given that the opportunity arose
and then fell away in 2004, perhaps, “under what circumstances?”  A set of
circumstances that arose in the late 20th century may provide some insight.
In 1978, the U.S. and Mexico entered into bilateral treaties that (1) delimit
the EEZ between the two nations in the Gulf of Mexico; and (2) delimit the
continental shelf in the area of the gulf known as the “western gap.”  The
U.S. had refrained from moving on these agreements for decades but finally
ratified the agreements rapidly when the deep waters of the Gulf of Mexico
and areas of the Continental shelf beyond the EEZ became ripe for
development. 
In 1997, the U.S. Minerals Management Service, the agency with
authority to solicit, accept, and administer lease tract bids, announced that
it would offer offshore leases for tracts in the western gap contingent upon
a successful agreement between the two nations on that area.  The
Government of Mexico indicated that no agreement on the gap could be
considered until the U.S. first ratified the boundary treaty.  The increased
interest in the deep waters of the Gulf of Mexico prompted the U.S. Senate
Foreign Relations Committee to hold hearings in September of 1997
regarding the maritime boundary in the Gulf. 
The Foreign Relations Committee favorably reported the 1978 Treaty
to the Senate shortly after the hearings.  The full Senate voted to ratify it on
October 23, 1997.  The two countries' leaders made specific reference to
the final formalization during a visit by Mexico’s President Ernesto Zedillo
to Washington a month later.  In a joint declaration issued from the White
House, Presidents Clinton and Zedillo emphasized the “ratification of our
Maritime Boundary Treaty as an important step to fully demarcate our
common maritime border.”140  With the entry into force of the maritime
boundary treaty, the two nations moved forward with talks regarding the
western gap.  
On June 9, 2000, the U.S. and Mexico signed the “Treaty Between the
Government of the United States of America and the Government of the
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United Mexican States on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf in the
Western Gulf of Mexico Beyond 200 Nautical Miles.”141  The U.S. Senate
gave its advice and consent to ratification on October 18, 2000, and the
Mexican Senate followed suit on November 28, 2000.  On January 17,
2001, the treaty entered into force upon exchange of the instruments of
ratification.  A boundary line was agreed upon to delimit the continental
shelf within the western gap.
CONCLUSION
Are there any credible signs that indicate U.S. accession is likely to
occur soon?  While there seems to be no critical mass of existing
commercial support similar to the support that prompted the agreements
between the U.S. and Mexico, it is questionable whether such commercial
readiness would serve as a sufficient impetus for Senate ratification of the
Convention.  Unlike the U.S.-Mexico agreements, the terms of the 1982
Convention are much more far-ranging and are part of a treaty with over
140 state parties as well as compulsory dispute resolution processes.  None-
theless, it seems as though the Article 76 continental shelf research that
continues in the U.S. suggests that data is being gathered to inform a cost-
benefit analysis as part of the Convention accession debate.  
Additionally, statements in support of Convention accession continue
to flow into Washington. Echoing Secretary of State Rice’s recommenda-
tion to ratify the Convention “as soon as possible,” a wide range of
business, environmental and government figures urged U.S. accession in a
letter to Senate majority Leader Bill Frist on August 31, 2005.142  The
letter, in pertinent part, stated:
All major U.S. ocean industries, including offshore energy,
maritime transportation and commerce, fishing, and shipbuilding
support U.S. accession to the Convention because its provisions
help protect vital U.S. economic interests and provide the certainty
and stability crucial for investment in global maritime enterprises.
Environmental organizations also strongly support the Convention.
As a party, the U.S. would be in the best position to lead future
applications of this framework for regional and international
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cooperation in protecting and preserving the marine environment.
The congressionally mandated and Presidentially appointed U.S.
Commission on Ocean Policy and the privately funded Pew Oceans
Commission both unanimously recommend accession to the Law
of the Sea Convention as an important part of a comprehensive and
coordinated U.S. ocean policy.143
Yet support for the Convention in the Senate itself seems to be eroding.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee may be wary of scheduling new
hearings and a vote on the Convention unless there are clear signs of
support from the Senate leadership and a majority of senators.  Barring that
pro-Convention environment, individual senators may not wish to risk
political capital in an endeavor that might tar them as U.N.-friendly actors
too willing to relinquish U.S. sovereignty (real or perceived).
If the U.S. remains “on the outside looking in,” it will have to continue
to rely upon its treaty-as-reflection contentions to claim the benefits that are
available under the terms of the Convention and Implementation Agree-
ment.  It remains to be seen whether any state parties to the Convention on
the Law of the Sea will challenge such claims.
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Figure 1.  On March 11, 2004, the Treaty and Implementation
Agreement were placed on the Senate schedule and became eligible
for the final phase that would bring the U.S. into State Party
membership of the Convention.
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Figure 2.  Pursuant to Senate rules, at the adjournment of the 108th
Congress at the end of 2004, the Treaty reverted to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee.
